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Abstract
Identifying investment strategies that will survive in the long run is
a main endeavor in the eld of evolutionary nance. The evolutionary
perspective on the nancial market considers rather long time hori-
zons, making the creation and disappearance of rms a highly relevant
factor in determining such strategies. However, this factor has not
been examined in existing research. This paper seeks to ll the gap in
the literature by simulating dividends and investment strategies on the
basis of initial public oerings (IPOs) and defaults. This paper simu-
lates the evolution of the wealth shares of various investment strategies
in a setup wherein dividends are nonstationary. The results show that
a modied version of the generalized Kelly rule dominates competing
investment strategies in terms of nal wealth. This nding agrees with
the existing literature, which suggests that the generalized Kelly rule
has good chances of surviving or even taking over the entire market
in dierent setups. However, the creation and dissolution of a rm
can only be observed once in the life of a company; therefore, using
only a long time series of one company alone is not the most optimal
method of estimating the probability that a rm will default. Instead,
the dividend process must be understood by examining similar com-
panies. This completely alters the implementation of the generalized
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2Kelly rule compared with the way it is applied in the existing evo-
lutionary nance literature, even when the dividend processes of the
companies involved are independent of each other.
31 Introduction
Financial analysis is based on the rationale that companies with similar char-
acteristics exhibit a comparable rm value. One possible explanation for
this may be that events that can only be observed once in the entire life of
a company have a tremendous impact on the future of that company. Ex-
amples of such events are the rst blockbuster product of a biotechnology
company, the development of the iPhone by Apple Inc., or the default of
a company. Moreover, such events can only be studied by examining simi-
lar companies. Further, this paper seeks to demonstrate that, in a market
with several investment strategies, investors who incorporate cross-sectional
information (i.e., information from other rms) in their investment decisions
perform better than those who do not. In other words, the share of the total
wealth accumulated using the strategies of the former increases more quickly
than that accrued by those of the latter. Accordingly, strategies that perform
poorly are marginalized in the long run. Briey, this paper will show that the
market selects investors who use cross-sectional information and that other
strategies disappear in the long term.
The idea that the market selects investors who use all available informa-
tion and who act rationally was initially proposed by Friedman (1953) and
Fama (1965). According to these researchers, irrational investors earn lower
returns and disappear in the long run. However, Long et al. (1990) used
a partial equilibrium model to show that the eects of decisions made by
irrational investors on stock prices cannot always be corrected by rational
investors because the latter are risk averse. In addition, Blume and Easley
(1992) proved that a rational investor who does not maximize a logarithmic
utility function can be driven out of a complete market by some irrational
investors, assuming that every investor has the same savings rate. For exoge-
nous asset prices, Kelly (1956) developed a theory of maximizing expected
returns on long-term (nancial) investments. To do so, the investor has to bet
his beliefs. Maximizing the growth rate as the Kelly rule does is equivalent
to maximizing a logarithmic utility function. Therefore, a slightly irrational
investor who almost maximizes a logarithmic utility function can push a ra-
tional investor who maximizes a nonlogarithmic utility function out of the
market on the basis of the higher growth rate of his wealth as in Blume and
Easley (1992).
Samuelson (1979) argued that individuals should maximize their utility
(and therefore their happiness), regardless of whether they survive in the
market. However, this paper focuses on identifying the strategies that survive
a market selection process, rather than on making people happy. Because of
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the exogenously given savings rate, the asset allocations in Blume and Easley
(1992) are neither Pareto optimal nor do they have a general equilibrium
model. Sandroni (2000) and Blume and Easley (2006) investigated market
selection in a general equilibrium setting with complete markets, and found
that rational investors survive when all investors have the same discount rate,
but the same does not apply in incomplete markets. These are addressed in
detail by Evstigneev et al. (2006), and Evstigneev et al. (2008) showed that
if all strategies and dividends possess Markov properties or that dividends
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), the generalized Kelly rule
will drive all strategies that depend only on the actual state of the world out
of the market, given that the initial wealth of the competing strategies is
small enough (this property is called local evolutionary stability). This is
further generalized by Amir et al. (2009b); they found that the generalized
Kelly rule is asymptotically unique among all survival strategies that depend
only on the history of states. This implies that the Kelly rule has almost
surely a strictly positive wealth share that is independent of the strategy of
the other investors. However, asset prices depend not only on the past states
but also on the strategies of the other investors. Therefore, these results
are for many relevant strategies as for example momentum strategies not
applicable. However, simulation results from Tupak (2009) indicate that the
generalized Kelly rule will dominate, given that the true parameters of the
dividend process are known.1
What types of investment strategies survive if dividends are nonstationary
and assets can be created and dissolved? Econometricians have long debated
whether dividends contain a unit root or follow a stationary process, and the
discussion is still not completely resolved.2 Summarizing this debate, the test
statistics of the unit root tests suggest that the hypothesis of a unit root in
dividends is more dicult to maintain than the hypothesis of a unit root in
stock prices. Further, Harris and Tzavalis (2004) have rejected the unit root
hypothesis for dividends, and DeJong and Whiteman (1991) have also found
it implausible. Therefore, this paper will concentrate on the implications
of the second market feature, which states that assets can be created and
destroyed. This feature automatically generates a nonstationary dividend
process because many companies, including large ones that are very stable
in the short term, did not exist, say, 200 years ago. To determine strategies
1The generalized Kelly rule also applies to one-period assets with an arbitrary dividend
process, see Evstigneev et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2005), and Amir et al.
(2005).
2For arguments surrounding the existence of a unit root in dividends, see Shiller (1981),
Kleidon (1986), Campbell and Shiller (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1988), DeJong and
Whiteman (1991), and Harris and Tzavalis (2004).
5that will survive in the long run, it is therefore important to consider the
fact that companies can disappear and new companies will enter the market.
It is often assumed that dividends are driven by one and the same pro-
cess over the entire life of a company. This is a very simplistic assumption:
for instance, why should a small startup have the same risk and expected
returns as a large concern? Mueller (1972) suggested a rm life-cycle: small
rms are more protable and face greater risks than large ones, but the large
rms pay greater dividends. This life-cycle is driven by the idea that small
rms tend to be more innovative but have diculties in accessing the credit
market and are therefore unable to pay dividends. Hall (1987) and Evans
(1987a,b) found support for this theory in their work on US manufacturing
rms, which led them to conclude that small rms grow more quickly and
are riskier than larger rms. Similarly, Dhawan (2001) discovered that small
US manufacturers are more productive and riskier than large ones. Fama
and French (2001), Grullon et al. (2002), DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006),
and DeAngelo et al. (2006) provided empirical evidence for the life-cycle hy-
pothesis of dividend policy, which holds that large rms pay more dividends
than small, growing companies. In addition to the possibility of default and
the constructible and destructible nature of rms, this paper will consider
the fact that small rms with small dividend payments may become large
rms with high dividend payments.
The main aim of this paper is to nd a surviving strategy for nonstation-
ary dividends modeled on the creation and destruction of companies. Since
the generalized Kelly rule is not feasible in this setup, the adopted strategy
ensures that funds that are invested into a company are proportional to the
expected net present value (NPV) of that companys dividends. This pa-
per makes several observations. First, the NPV-strategy is able to dominate
the markets in simulations; this indicates that the results from the innitely
lived assets seem to generalize to this setup. Second, many observations are
required if the parameters of the process and the portfolio weights have to
be estimated from past observations of the dividends. If past observations
of dividends are lacking, a generalized Kelly rule with estimated parame-
ters can be driven out of the market using simple strategies. This conrms
the theoretical ndings pertaining to innitely lived assets obtained by Amir
et al. (2009a) and the simulation ndings for stationary dividends obtained
by Tupak (2009). Third, if a wrong dividend process is assumed, the opti-
mal Kelly rule can produce worse results than a naïve strategy that invests
the same amount in each asset. This is shown in a case were the investor
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assumed the dividends to be i.i.d.,3 while in reality, the dividends followed a
nonstationary process.
Section 2 provides empirical evidence that the creation and disappearance
of companies is an important factor in the dividend process and discusses
further stylized facts. Section 3 presents a simple and minimalist dividend
model that conforms to the literature discussed and the empirical evidence
presented herein. Section 4 describes the market selection model in which the
investment strategies detailed in Section 5 will compete. Section 6 simulates
some models and Section 7 summarizes the papers ndings.
2 Empirical evidence on the birth, death, and
dividends of companies
The present section motivates the assumptions for the dividend process de-
scribed in the next section. This section mainly shows that, over the last
40 years, many new rms have been founded and are default, a fact that
is often neglected in evolutionary nance. Furthermore, dividend payments
are largely issued from a small number of companies, and the percentages of
dividends paid by dierent sectors change over time. All of this demonstrates
that dividends are highly nonstationary.
To illustrate these points, a sample of 25,272 active and inactive North
American companies that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE),
the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or the NASDAQ Stock Market is
used. The data have been obtained from the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), and they are for the period 1973 through 2009. The starting
date of 1973 was chosen because that is the earliest year from which AMEX
and NASDAQ data are available. A company is considered active as long
as it is listed on a certain stock exchange. Within this period, the number
of active companies varies from 5,267 to 9,843 per year; the average is 7,138
companies per year. The large dierence between the number of active com-
panies per year and the number of active and inactive companies indicates
that many rms were newly founded and that a large number of companies
disappeared.
A company is active for an average time period of 10.51 years, and the
median is lower: eight years. Figure 1 shows the number of companies that
3This assumption was used in the simulations of Hens et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-
Hoppé (2004), and Tupak (2009).
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Figure 1: Number of years a company was in the sample (CRSP data from
1973 to 2009).
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remain in the sample for any given number of years. Approximately a quar-
ter of all rms were in the sample for less than four years, thus making it
extremely dicult to determine the value of an asset on the basis of its past
dividends. Therefore, cross-sectional information may be helpful in ascertain-
ing the value and risk and therefore also the optimal amounts of investment
in such assets.
The largest part of the variation in the number of active rms can be
explained by mergers and acquisitions (see Table 1). Of the 18,837 delistings
reported by the CRSP from 1973 to 2009, a total of 9,782 are attributable to
this source. The next most important reason for deletion is being dropped
from the stock exchange. The number of dropped companies is much higher
than the number of liquidated companies, and this indicates that the big
stock exchanges delist companies with nancial problems before the worst
happens. Table 2 provides detailed reasons for dropping the companies: 1,282
companies were delisted because of insucient capital, 930 because their price
was too low, 647 because of insolvency, and 982 because they did not pay
exchange fees. Therefore, the proportion of defaulting companies accounts
for at least 12.5% of all companies, based on a time period of 36 years. The
number of new companies is also signicant: 19,318 such companies emerged
during the period under study, working out to an average of 536.6 per year.
These gures plainly demonstrate that long-run investment strategies should
not neglect the fact that rms have nite lives.
Neither the numbers of delisted companies nor the reasons these compa-
nies were delisted are constant over time (see Table 1). Typically, everything
happens in waves. For example, many new companies were founded between
1991 and 1997, and a merger wave occurred from 1996 to 2001. Between
1998 and 2004, the number of companies fell and the number of liquida-
tions increased tremendously, and this phenomenon was repeated in 2008
and 2009. Due to this cyclical pattern, the number of companies also moves
in waves. These ndings correspond with the initial public oering (IPO)
waves discovered by Ibbotson and Jae (1975), the procyclical behavior of
IPOs noted by Pástor and Veronesi (2005), and the countercyclical behavior
of default probabilities observed in Vassalou and Xing (2004), Chava and
Jarrow (2004), and Chen (2010).
To aggregate dividends data from the CRSP, the number of outstanding
shares on the day before the ex-distribution date must be multiplied by the
dividend per share and then aggregated over one calendar year. For these
calculations, only cash dividends were taken into account (i.e., subscription
rights etc. were excluded from the estimations). Figure 2 aggregates the divi-
9Year Active Mergers Liquidation Dropped
1973 5,954 103 5 354
1974 5,558 99 11 168
1975 5,398 83 10 80
1976 5,415 101 17 53
1977 5,390 155 18 61
1978 5,344 191 11 70
1979 5,267 209 16 51
1980 5,431 164 24 83
1981 5,794 155 15 88
1982 6,008 172 21 159
1983 6,606 173 11 164
1984 6,862 210 13 229
1985 6,982 248 16 325
1986 7,375 225 26 319
1987 7,642 185 5 225
1988 7,655 352 12 312
1989 7,390 273 13 318
1990 7,218 197 9 339
1991 7,251 119 12 367
1992 7,538 135 9 380
1993 8,108 177 3 170
1994 8,676 279 3 198
1995 9,055 358 9 233
1996 9,608 437 10 174
1997 9,843 511 7 255
1998 9,695 603 5 422
1999 9,374 613 11 394
2000 9,055 631 11 326
2001 8,337 463 7 473
2002 7,653 259 17 390
2003 7,228 257 11 297
2004 7,064 265 17 147
2005 7,043 268 7 162
2006 6,971 312 7 123
2007 7,000 392 8 184
2008 6,563 250 22 230
2009 6,237 158 36 267
Total 9,782 465 8,590
Table 1: Active companies (at the end of the year) and reasons for delisting
(CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
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Reason for Dropping Firms
Issue stopped trading on current exchangereason unavail-
able
965
Issue transferred from current exchange to Mutual Funds 18
Issue transferred from current exchange to Boston Ex-
change
33
Issue transferred from current exchange to Midwest Ex-
change
2
Issue transferred from current exchange to Pacic Stock
Exchange
17
Issue transferred from current exchange to Philadelphia
Stock Exchange
3
Issue transferred from current exchange to Toronto Stock
Exchange
3
Issue began trading over the counter 375
Delisted by current exchangeinsucient number of market
makers
464
Delisted by current exchangeinsucient number of share-
holders
170
Delisted by current exchangeprice fell below acceptable
level
930
Delisted by current exchangeinsucient capital, surplus,
and/or equity
1,282
Delisted by current exchangeinsucient (or noncompli-
ance with rules of) oat or assets
707
Delisted by current exchangecompany request (no reason
given)
512
Delisted by current exchangecompany request (deregistra-
tion owing to going private)
81
Delisted by current exchangebankruptcy (declared insol-
vent)
647
Delisted by current exchangecompany request (oer re-
scinded and issue withdrawn by underwriter)
15
Delisted by current exchangedelinquent in ling and non-
payment of fees
982
Delisted by current exchangefailure to register under Sec-
tion 12G of the Securities Exchange Act
112
Delisted by current exchangefailure to meet exception or
equity requirements
167
Delisted by current exchangedenied temporary exception
requirement
10
Delisted by current exchangedoes not meet exchanges -
nancial guidelines for continued listing
867
Delisted by current exchangeprotection of investors and
the public interest
137
Delisted by current exchangecorporate governance viola-
tion
13
Conversion of a closed-end investment company to an open-
end investment company
47
Delisted by current exchangerequired by the Securities Ex-
change Commission (SEC)
31
Table 2: Reasons that companies were dropped from their exchange (CRSP
data from 1973 to 2009)
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Figure 2: Dividends by Standard Industrial Classication (SIC) sector and
SIC dividends relative to total dividends, that is, the dividends of one sector
divided by total dividends (CRSP data from 1973 to 2009)
dends by sector, and Figure 2(b) shows the relative weight of dividends being
paid by dierent sectors. Until 2007, the dividends paid by the nancial sec-
tor increased at a faster rate than those paid by the manufacturing industry
and the transport and telecommunication sector. After the nancial crisis in
2008, the dividends of the nancial sector reduced drastically. This reveals
persistent shifts in the relative weight of dividends being paid by dierent
sectors. Such shifts are quite natural; the railroad and textile industries, for
instance, were much more important one hundred years ago than they are
today. Long-term shifts are incompatible with the assumption of i.i.d. divi-
dend shares of the dierent sectors (or companies), and this assumption has
often been made by parts of the evolutionary nance literature.
No dividends were paid in 57.2% of all company years, which are dened
as the years during which a company is active. In 5.5% of all company years,
dividends increased from zero to a positive amount and in 5.3% of the years,
dividends fell to zero. This indicates that large variations in dividends are
a very characteristic feature of dividend time series. Furthermore, the top
5% of dividend payers4 distributed, on average, 78% of all dividends. This
percentage varied between 71% and 85%, reaching its lowest in 1979 and
peaking in 2001. These gures show that dividend payment is enormously
4The top 5% of dividend payers constitute 5% of the companies paying the highest
total dividends.
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concentrated among a few rms and that this concentration trended upward
over time.
This section has noted several patterns relating to company numbers
and dividend payment. To reect these patterns, a long-run dividend model
should exhibit the following features: a dynamic number of companies, wave-
like changes in the number of companies, some large jumps in dividends,
concentration of dividend payments among a small fraction of rms, and the
capacity to accommodate shifts of dividends between dierent sectors.
3 Dividend model
This section will present a dividend model that is based on the stylized
facts established in the previous section. Within this model, rms can be
born and default, and a few large corporations issue a large percentage of
dividend payments. In other words, small, young rms (startups) pay only a
small dividend and are at high risk of defaulting, but have opportunities to
grow into concerns, which pay large dividends. To provide more detail, this
model assumes an economy that consists of three types of companies: IPOs,
startups, and concerns. IPOs are rms that have newly entered the market.
In the entering period, investors pay a certain amount for an IPO and do
not receive a dividend, and in the second period, the IPO automatically
becomes a startup. Startups pay low dividends and may grow into concerns,
which are mature rms that spend large sums on dividends but cannot grow
further. These characteristics reect the empirical evidence produced by
Hall (1987), Evans (1987a,b), and Dhawan (2001), which demonstrates that
younger rms have higher growth rates than older rms. Both types of
companies can default and a company may change types in any period (a
dead company being one such type). That is to say, a startup can default,
remain a startup, or become a concern, and a concern can either default
or remain a concern. A company that has defaulted is dead forever. The
transition probabilities in Figure 3 are given as follows: pSD is the probability
that a startup will default during a period and pSS is the probability that
the startup will remain a startup. If the startup survives, then pSD is the
probability that it will default during the next period. The probability that
a startup becomes a concern is then given by pSC = 1 pSS pSD. A concern
may remain a concern or default, and the probabilities for these events are
pCC and pCD = 1  pCC .
Type changes are independent between companies and over time. If pSD
and pCD are strictly positive, every company will default at one point in
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Figure 3: Development of a company over time. An IPO becomes a startup,
a startup can become a concern or disappear after several periods, and a
concern will exist for several periods and then disappear. The probability of
each event is presented beside the arrows.
time, that is, if t!1 the probability that a company is defaulted converges
to 1. To guarantee that some companies will always exist, the number of
IPOs in every period, nnew, exceeds zero. The number of startups, concerns,
and IPOs are represented by nSt , n
C
t , and nnew, respectively. The long-run
averages of the number of startups and concerns can be calculated as follows:
E
 
nS

=
nnew
1  pSS and E
 
nC

=
pSC  nnew
(1  pSS)(1  pSC) : (1)
Every year, every startup pays a xed strictly positive dividend DS, and
each concern pays a xed dividend DC > DS. The xed dividend DS re-
mains constant from the foundation of a startup to the point where it either
becomes a concern or dies. Should it become a concern, the dividend of the
new concern experiences a huge upward jump; should it die, however, DS
permanently falls to zero. A concern pays DC every year until it is dissolved.
Therefore, the sum of all dividends paid by startups in a single period is the
result of nSt D
S and the total of all dividends paid by concerns during the
same period is nCt D
C . Since IPOs do not pay dividends, it follows that the
total dividend paid out in period t is the sum of the dividends paid by the
startups and the concerns. The general structure of this dividend model is
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Startup Concern Miscellaneous
DS 1 DC 40.1 nnew 1
pSD 2.3% pCD 0.6% 0 5%
pSS 97.0% pCC 99.4%
pSC 0.7%
Table 3: Simulation parameters calibrated on CRSP data
not completely new. Hurley and Johnson (1994) used a similar trinomial
model to price individual stocks.
This model incorporates most of the features mentioned at the end of
Section 2. The number of companies is dynamic and undergoes wave-like
changes. Dividend payments can be parameterized so that they are largely
paid by concerns and only fractionally disbursed by startups and are therefore
concentrated among the concerns. To ensure that the simulation problem in
Section 6 is tractable, the number of IPOs in every period is set to one.
Simulations show that, with this assumption, the number of startups and
concerns is changing drastically over time. Adding waves in the number
of IPOs, as observed in the data of Section 2, would strengthen this eect
further. Mergers are not included in the model because they do not matter,
assuming that the dividends and portfolio weights of the new rm are the sum
of the merging companies. Owing to the fact that new companies enter the
market at all the times and existing companies disappear in the long run,
changes in the dividends between several sectors can be explained by the
model: in a certain time frame, mainly textile rms could enter the market,
while in another period, only IT rms, and so on. That is, the sector of
rms entering the market changes over time. After a certain period, the
IPOs become concerns and pay considerable dividends, thereby leading to
an increase in the importance of the sector. If no new rm of a certain sector
enters the market, the sector disappears in the long run. As a whole, the
model is very simple, but it includes many elements that are important in
the long-run dividend process.
This paper aims to simulate the wealth shares of dierent investment
strategies. For this, dividends must also be simulated. Table 3 shows the
parameters of the dividend process. These are calibrated with CRSP data
for the years 1973 to 2009 in order to correlate the dividend process with
the stylized facts underlying the dividend model. Table 2 does not conrm
whether companies that were dropped from their exchanges were delisted
owing to nancial problems. Because of that uncertainty, the decision re-
garding which type a company belongs to is based on market capitalization:
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a company that has belonged to the top decile of all companies for at least
two years is classied as a concern from that point until it defaults. Compa-
nies that neither qualied as concerns nor belonged to the lowest decile for
at least two years in a row are classied as startups. A startup defaults if its
value remains in the lowest decile for the rest of its life, whereas a concern
defaults if its value remains below the largest 30% of all active companies for
the rest of its life. The default threshold for concerns may seem high, but
the market value of a concern dened as dead is approximately ve times
lower than the market value at which a startup becomes a concern. In other
words, this threshold ensures that a concern must have suered substantial
losses before it defaults. The dividends of a startup, DS, is normalized to
one. The concern dividends, DC , are determined in two steps. First, the
quotient obtained by dividing every year the average of concern dividends
through the average of startup dividends. This results in the dividends of the
concerns in every year (DS is normed to 1). Given that, the dividend of the
concern is the average over all the years from which this quotient is derived.
This dividend process is unrealistic for two reasons: rst, it does not consider
mergers, and second, it assigns equal dividend amounts to all company types.
However, these simplications allow us to observe the eects of the creation,
growth, and default of rms on the wealth of investment strategies, which is
the main purpose of this model.
4 Market selection model
As stated in the previous section, the dividend model is based on exogenously
given dividends. In the next step of the dividend process, the companies
generating these dividends are traded in a market and their shares may be
purchased by several investors. This section will describe how the wealth of
diering investment strategies and with that the asset returns evolve over
time.
The state of nature in t is !(t) and is described by the dividend pay-
ment of all companies at t. Therefore, the history of states equals !t =
(!(0); : : : ; !(t)). Given this, the percentage of wealth consumed by invest-
ment strategy i, at t in an economy with I investment strategies is dened
as i0;t (!
t), where i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig. This percentage is assumed to be constant
over time and identical for all strategies because this paper focuses on com-
paring the performance of investment strategies, rather than analyzing the
inuence of the savings rate. Further, this assumption allows us to simplify
i0;t (!
t) to 0, which is important because it eliminates the possibility that
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an irrational strategy will survive by having a higher savings rate than ra-
tional strategies. In such a case, the rational strategy has a higher return,
but the irrational strategy achieves a higher growth rate through a higher
savings ratio and thereby marginalizing the rational strategy in the long run
(see, e.g., Blume and Easley (1992)).
The percentage of wealth invested by shareholder i in company k at time
t is represented by ik;t (!
t). Nonexistent companies must have portfolio
weights of zero; therefore, ik;t (!
t) = 0 for all companies that do not exist
at t. Every strategy can invest in any existing company, but short selling
is not allowed; that is, 0  ik;t (!t)  1. This budget constraint implies
that
P
k 
i
k;t (!
t) = 1. Note that the sum over k can be interpreted as the
sum over all past, actual, and future companies. However, it is not possible
to invest in nonexistent companies, so this equates to adding up only the
investments made in companies existing in period t. The wealth of investor i
in t is wit and the price of asset k in t is qk;t. Therefore, the number of shares
held by investor i in company k at time t is
ik;t =
(
ik;t(!t)wit
qk;t
if company k exists in t
0 otherwise:
(2)
If the number of stocks issued by a company is normalized to one and if all
stocks need to be held by someone, the price of one stock in company k at t,
or the market capitalization of that company, can be given as follows:
qk;t =
IX
i=1
ik;t
 
!t

wit =: k;t
 
!t

wt (3)
where wt is a column vector including the wealth of all investors in period
t and k;t (!
t) is a row vector with the portfolio weights of all investors in
asset k during period t. The asset prices can be written in matrix notation
as follows:
qt = t
 
!t

wt; (4)
where qt is a price vector including all companies and t (!
t) is a matrix of
all portfolio weights of period t. The number of rows represents the number
of assets, and the number of columns represents the number of investors.
Finally, the vector wt includes the wealth of every investor in t. The wealth
of an investor in t+ 1 is equal to the value of his portfolio plus the dividend
payment:
wit+1 =
X
k
 
Dkt+1
 
!t+1

+ qk;t+1

ik;t: (5)
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The dividends of asset k at t + 1 are represented by Dkt+1 (!
t+1). Note that
qk;t+1 and 
i
k;t depend on wt and k;t (!
t). The next step is to express the
wealth dynamic in terms of exogenously given variables as the dividends and
the strategy that depends only on the state of the world, !t. The preceding
equation can be expressed in matrix notation as follows:
wt+1 =
X
k
 
Dkt+1
 
!t+1

+ qk;t+1

k;t; (6)
= tDt+1
 
!t+1

+tqt+1; (7)
= tDt+1
 
!t+1

+tt+1
 
!t+1

wt+1; (8)
where the last equation follows from equation (4). The number of shares
held by all investors in all companies, k;t, is a column vector with the length
of the number of investors and t combines the vectors k;t into a matrix
in which the number of investors is designated by the number of rows and
the number of assets by the number of columns. Furthermore, Dt+1 (!
t+1) is
the vector denoting the dividends of all assets in t+ 1, given the state !t+1.
Writing wt+1 on one side of the equation results in 
I tt+1
 
!t+1

wt+1 = tDt+1
 
!t+1

: (9)
The evolution of wealth is therefore
wt+1 =
 
I tt+1
 
!t+1
 1
tDt+1
 
!t+1

: (10)
The next step is to check whether the wealth of all investors in t + 1, wt+1,
and the stock prices during the same period, qt+1, are always nonnegative.
This is important because negative asset prices make no economic sense and
negative wealth presents the problem of whether the investor will be able to
pay back his or her debts. The system can be considered well-dened if the
wealth of all investors and prices of all assets are nonnegative during all t.
This requires three assumptions:
Assumption 1. Consumption takes place and does not violate the rule that
0 < i0;t (!
t) < 1 for all i, t, and !t.
Assumption 2. At least one completely diversied portfolio rule is in force:
an i exists such that ik;t (!
t) > 0 for all existing k, t, and !t.
Assumption 3. If a company, k, is dead or not yet founded at t, then nobody
invests in it (i.e., ik;t (!
t) = 0).
Proposition 1. Suppose that w0 > 0 and assumptions 1 to 3 are satised.
Then, the evolution of wealth (10) is well dened in all t <1.
18 5 STRATEGIES
Mainly, the proposition holds because this setup is constructed so that
both t and t (!
t) contain many zeros; consequently, the step from t to
t + 1 is only inuenced by companies existing in both periods. Considering
this, the proof for Proposition 1 is analogous to that supplied by Evstigneev
et al. (2006). Since the chief eect of Proposition 1 is to enable proper
model simulation, the restriction to a nite number of time periods is not
problematic.
The model may appear very similar to that of Evstigneev et al. (2006) or
Amir et al. (2009a), but it is not possible to show that the generalized Kelly
rule is locally evolutionary stable5 or is a (unique) surviving strategy. A main
prerequisite of their result is that consumption is a constant share of total
wealth. In the present setup, shareholders pay a certain amount of money to
establish a newly founded IPO, and this amount depends on the investment
strategies of the investors and is therefore typically not constant over time.
This fraction of investor wealth leaves the economy and is hence also a form
of consumption, but because it is not constant over time, it is not possible
to conrm the existence of principles such as local evolutionary stability or a
unique surviving strategy. Results on these subjects are therefore provided
by simulations. However, before this, the strategies to be considered for
simulations must be dened.
5 Strategies
This paper has thus far delineated a dividend model and an evolutionary
market selection model and will now proceed to discuss investor strategies,
which must be known in order to simulate the entire market. Which strategies
should compete in this model? A good starting point may be a generalized
version of the Kelly rule:
k;t =
0
1  0
1X
m=1
(1  0)m E
 
dk;t+m(!
t+m) j !t ;
where dk;t are the relative dividends of asset k at t (i.e., dk;t =
DktP
i D
i
t
). The
strategy  has a probability of one of resulting in a positive wealth share
when applied to both short (one-period) and innitely long-lived assets see
Amir et al. (2009a,b). However, neither this nor other results from literature
dealing with local and evolutionary stability apply to the strategy  in a
5A strategy that drives every other strategy out of the market if the initial wealth of
the other strategy is small enough is considered locally evolutionary stable.
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market wherein new companies can be established or rms can default. Fur-
thermore, the strategy is not directly applicable in the setup of this paper.
This is because new companies will enter the market in future periods and
will, therefore, pay positive relative dividends. These assets are not included
in the calculation of , which must therefore not sum up to one. This issue
can be circumvented by including only those companies that existed during
t in the calculation of the relative dividends in the formula for k;t. From
a practical point of view, the lack of a closed-form solution for calculating
 is a more problematic issue. The strategy could be estimated via simu-
lation, but doing so over an innite time horizon would be time consuming
and/or imprecise. Moreover, the evolutionary setup requires that this calcu-
lation be performed thousands of times, which was not practicable. Portfolio
weights proportional to the NPV of the companies dividends provided a close
substitute. The NPV of asset k with discount factor 1  0 is dened by
NPVk =
1X
m=1
(1  0)m E
 
Dk;t+m(!
t+m) j !t :
The NPVs of the dividends of the dierent types of companies are as follows:
NPVconcern =
(1  0) pCCDC
1  (1  0) pCC
NPVstartup = (1  0)
pSSD
S + pSC
 
DC +NPVconcern

1  (1  0) pSS
NPVIPO = (1  0)
 
NPVstartup+D
S

:
If NPVk;t is dened as the NPV of asset k in period t, then the strategy
based on the relative NPVs is as follows:
1k;t
 
!t

=
NPVk;tP
j NPVj;t
:
To nd out whether the NPV strategy approximates the generalized Kelly
rule, the portfolio weights of both strategies were calculated for several pa-
rameterizations and then compared. To determine the portfolio weights of
the Kelly rule, the relative dividends of the companies were simulated 1,000
periods ahead, and the Kelly strategy was calculated using these dividends.
This process was repeated 10,000 times. The average of these 10,000 real-
izations gives . This result not only shows that the formula for the NPV
is similar to the formula for . In fact, the NPV strategy and the general-
ized Kelly rule are equivalent if total dividends in the economy are constant
over time. The rest of the paper mainly uses one standard parameterization,
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which can be found in Table 3. The parameters of the standard parameteri-
zation are varied in Table 4, and the dierence between the allocation of the
Kelly rule, , and the NPV-strategy, 1 of these variations are presented in
Panels A to D.6 The total share of wealth invested in concerns, startups, and
IPOs is calculated, and the percentage dierence between the generalized
Kelly rule and the NPV strategy is shown in Table 4. In most cases, the
dierence is well below 0.5%, which shows that the results produced by the
two strategies are close to being identical. However, the dierences between
the two strategies widen massively when the default probability for concerns
achieves 5% or more; overall, a generalized Kelly rule investor would invest
almost 4% more in concerns than an NPV investor would under such cir-
cumstances. This indicates that dierences exist between these two types of
investors. Since the typical default probability for concerns is 1% or smaller,
this dierence has no impact on the simulations performed in the rest of this
paper, wherein the NPV strategy is used as a proxy for the generalized Kelly
rule because it can be calculated much faster than the latter can.
The previous strategy is called the theoretical NPV strategy since the pa-
rameters are assumed to be known. But in reality, the true parameters of the
dividend model are unknown. Therefore, these parameters are estimated on
the basis of past (simulated) data in order to compare this model with other
models. DC and DS can be directly observed from the data, thereby making
probability estimation quite simple. For example, pCD can be estimated by
dividing the number of defaults of concerns by the sum of the active concern
years of all the concerns plus the number of defaults. This estimator is also a
maximum likelihood estimator (MLE). With the estimated parameters, the
competing strategy 2k;t (!
t) can be calculated in the same way as 1k;t (!
t),
and it is called the empirical NPV strategy.
The next step is to nd some interesting alternative strategies. Hens
et al. (2002) and Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2004) applied a simple strategy;
they used average relative dividends as a proxy for . In the case of i.i.d.
dividends, this is the Kelly rule. Therefore this strategy is
3k;t
 
!t

=
c3
 + 1
X
i=0
Dkt i (!
t i)P
j D
j
t i (!t i)
:=
c3
 + 1
X
i=0
dkt i(!
t i):
The number of periods over which averaging has been conducted is repre-
sented by  and the factor c3 is chosen such that
PK
k=0 
3
k;t (!
t) = 1. This
constant is needed because the environment of the existing companies diers
6The parameters DS , pSS = 1  pSC   pSD and pCC = 1  pCD are not varied either
because they are normed to one or given by the other parameters.
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Panel A: Varying DC
DC 2 10 50 100
IPO: IPO   1IPO 0.021% -0.001% 0.001% -0.003%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.156% 0.102% 0.165% 0.205%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.177% -0.101% -0.166% -0.202%
Panel B: Varying pSC
pSC 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO 0.031% -0.006% -0.004% 0.000%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.304% 0.258% 0.198% 0.214%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.336% -0.252% -0.194% -0.215%
Panel C: Varying pSD
pSD 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO -0.010% -0.013% -0.001% -0.005%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S 0.100% 0.105% 0.120% 0.174%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C -0.090% -0.091% -0.120% -0.169%
Panel D: Varying pCD
pCD 10% 5% 2% 1%
IPO: IPO   1IPO -0.144% -0.120% -0.019% -0.009%
Startup: E
 
nS
   S   1S -3.585% -3.637% -0.430% 0.137%
Concern: E
 
nC
   C   1C 3.728% 3.757% 0.449% -0.127%
Table 4: Percentage dierence between the Kelly rule, , and the NPV strat-
egy, 1, in terms of total investment in IPOs, startups, and concerns. The
parameters of the dividend process can be found in Table 3. In each panel,
one parameter is varied. The strategies are calculated on the assumption
that the number of IPOs, startups, and concerns is equal to their long-run
averages of 1, E
 
nS

and E
 
nC

. The generalized Kelly rule, , is obtained
through 10,000 simulations over 1,000 time periods.
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in every time period and it is therefore not a given that the full budget of the
agents is used after the averaging. This paper uses this strategy with the 
values of 100, 20, and 0. Considering a long history to estimate the relative
dividends is eective in the case of i.i.d. relative dividends. In that case,
the strategy converges to . This is not the case in the selected dividend
model, but this strategy is still an important benchmark. The case of  = 0
is special in that it relies only on the current relative dividends. Therefore,
this strategy is the called current relative dividend strategy. Since it relies
only on an extremely short history, it may be in a strong position in a setup
where not much can be learnt from the past dividend history.
The last strategy diversies naively; it invests the same amount into all
existing assets. In other words,
5k;t
 
!t

=
1
Total number of active companies in t
:
This strategy may appear somewhat unsophisticated, but DeMiguel et al.
(2009) have showed that it performs astonishingly well on real data.
Obviously, many more strategies are possible. However, the generalized
Kelly rule performs best in simulations within the i.i.d. and stationary set-
ting, whereas mean-variance, adaptive, and even more sophisticated strate-
gies have no chance of surviving (see Hens et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-
Hoppé (2004), and Tupak (2009)). Therefore, it makes sense to examine
mainly those strategies on the basis of relative dividends, such as the gener-
alized Kelly rule. To ensure that this inference holds, Section 6.3 compares
the NPV strategy with a large number of xed-mix strategies and conrms
that the NPV strategy is not only a surviving strategy but, perhaps, also a
locally evolutionary stable strategy.
6 Simulations
The main purpose of this section is to simulate the wealth dynamic of the
competing investment strategies described above within the dividend process
detailed herein. This will be done using equation (10). First, a simple exam-
ple demonstrates the errors that can be produced by choosing an inadequate
strategy by wrongly assuming a stationary dividend process. Second, simu-
lations show that the NPV strategy is indeed able to take over a large part of
the market, and nally, some robustness checks are performed on the NPV
strategy.
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Figure 4: Relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals out of 1,000
simulations over 1,000 time periods. The market comprises two strategies:
the historical relative dividend strategy averaged over the previous 20 time
periods and the naive strategy. All strategies begin with equal wealth.
6.1 An illustrative example
With i.i.d. relative dividends, the Kelly rule  is equal to the average past
relative dividends, 3. This subsection shows that 3 is unable to domi-
nate the market under the dividend model of this paper with nonstationary
dividends and nitely lived assets, and it fails against the naive strategy of
investing the same amount into each asset, 5. In contrast to our paper, most
of the literature assumes i.i.d. dividends with innitely lived assets for their
simulations (see, e.g., Hens et al. (2002), Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2004), or
Tupak (2009)); this questions the relevance of these results. The dividend
process is parameterized according to Table 3. To emphasize the results of
this section, pSC was set at 0.15 (as a consequence, pSS = 0:827). This ex-
ample establishes that a naive strategy that invests an equal share of wealth
in every company can accumulate more wealth than a strategy based on the
average relative dividends of the previous 20 periods (see Figure 4). The two
strategies begin with equal wealth, and after 1,000 periods averaged out over
1,000 simulations, the naive 1=n-strategy claims 58:5% of the total wealth,
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whereas the historical relative dividend strategy accounts for 41:5%.7 8 This
result follows from the high probability that a startup will become a con-
cern, which the relative dividend investor, who invests according to the past
average relative dividends, neither knows nor takes into account because the
event is observed once in the life of a rm. In contrast, the 1=n-strategy
increases its wealth share by investing more funds in startups than the rel-
ative dividend strategy does. Therefore, both strategies will survive in the
long run. However, parameterizations calibrated on CRSP data show that
the success of the naïve investor in the real world falls far short of the out-
come achieved in this example. The simulated parameters in Table 3 put the
real-world probability of a startup becoming a concern at a mere 0.7% (not
15%). This parameter results in an average wealth share of just 6.2% for the
1=n-strategy after 1,000 periods. The simulations wherein pSC = 0:15 are an
example of how an optimal strategy may completely fail if a wrong dividend
process is assumed. Therefore, it is extremely important for evolutionary
simulations to assume a correctly specied dividend process.
6.2 Is the NPV strategy able to take over the market?
The main purpose of this section is to demonstrate that an NPV strategy will
nally take over almost the entire market. To achieve this objective, the pa-
rameters given in Table 3 were used to simulate changes in the wealth shares
of the NPV, current relative dividend, historical relative dividend, and naive
strategies. This involved estimating the mean and 95% condence intervals
of the relative wealth of the competing strategies on the basis of 1,000 simu-
lations (see Figure 5). The results conrm that the theoretical NPV strategy
outperforms all the other strategies to a striking extent. However, the strate-
gies converge very slowly compared to those used by Hens et al. (2002) and
Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2004), who use i.i.d. dividend processes. In par-
ticular, the current relative dividend strategy loses wealth shares so slowly
that after 1,000 periods, it still commands a larger market share than the
NPV strategy does. Given that the model was calibrated so that one period
equates to one year, this implies that evolutionary convergence can require
an extremely long time horizon, especially if the competing strategies are not
7Increasing the number of time periods to 5,000 (the default number of time periods
in the rest of the paper) does not have a signicant impact on the result.
8The simulations of the whole paper were also done with 100 simulations. The impact
on average wealth, the main variable of interest, is minor. The only visible dierence
was that the condence bands became smoother with 1,000 simulations. An even higher
number of simulations is therefore unlikely to alter the results.
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Figure 5: Relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals out of 1,000
simulations over 10,000 time periods. The market comprises four strategies:
the theoretical NPV strategy, the current relative dividends strategy, the his-
torical relative dividend strategy averaged over the previous 20 time periods,
and the naive strategy. All strategies begin with equal wealth.
26 6 SIMULATIONS
very dissimilar from the optimal one.
As mentioned earlier, a locally evolutionary stable strategy prevents in-
vading strategies from earning higher returns when it has almost all the
wealth in a market. Is the theoretical NPV strategy a locally evolutionary
stable strategy? This question is easily answered via simulation. The pro-
cess involves assuming that the theoretical NPV strategy begins with 97%
of total wealth and that the three other strategies each start o with 1% of
total wealth. On the basis of this assumption, 5,000 time periods are then
simulated 1,000 times in order to determine whether the theoretical NPV
strategy is able to retain its wealth share. The results of this procedure re-
veal that, after 5,000 periods, the theoretical NPV strategy owns an average
of 97.7% of total wealth, with a standard deviation of 0.9%. In contrast, the
current relative dividend strategy accrues an average of 1.3% of total wealth
with a standard deviation of 0.6%. The simulated distribution of the lat-
ters increase in wealth shows that it is not statistically signicant at the 5%
level. In other words, strategies with small total wealth shares are not able to
wrest market share away from the theoretical NPV strategy. Therefore, the
theoretical NPV strategy is evolutionary stable, at least against the chosen
alternative strategies.
The wealth shares of the NPV strategy should also be determined using
dividend parameters that are estimated from simulated dividend data, that
is, the empirical NPV strategy. To this end, the parameters of the dividend
process must be estimated over a sucient number of time periods to ensure
that the parameter values are precise enough. For example, if the parameters
for calculating the empirical NPV strategy are determined on the basis of the
previous 20 periods at every point of time, then the empirical strategy would
be vanquished by the current relative dividend strategy. Starting with 97%
of total wealth, the wealth share of the empirical NPV strategy would fall to
an average of 57.0% of total wealth after 5,000 periods simulated 1,000 times
each. Conversely, the wealth share of the current relative dividends strategy
would expand from 1% to 28.5% of total wealth, and the historical relative
dividends strategy and the naive strategy would gain 5.3% and 7.2% of addi-
tional wealth share, respectively. Figure 6 depicts the results of simulations
using parameters obtained on the basis of the previous 100 periods. Both
the empirical NPV and historical relative dividend strategies are now deter-
mined over the previous 100 periods so that the learning horizon remains
consistent between them. In the same setup, the empirical NPV strategy
acquires 98.0% of total wealth after 5,000 periods. All other strategies lose
in wealth share aside from the relative dividend strategy, whose wealth share
grows fractionally from 1% to 1.1%. In contrast to the results generated
6.2 Is the NPV strategy able to take over the market? 27
500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
W
ea
lth
 
 
Empirical NPV
cur. rel.  dividends
naive
hist. rel. dividends
Figure 6: The relative wealth mean and 95% condence intervals of 1,000
simulations of 5,000 time periods. The market comprises four strategies: the
empirical NPV strategy, the current relative dividends strategy, the historical
relative dividend strategy averaged over 100 periods, and the naïve strategy.
All strategies start with equal wealth.
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by parameters estimated from the previous 20 periods, these results show
that the empirical NPV strategy easily conquers the other strategies when
parameters calculated from the previous 100 periods are used. However,
the empirical NPV strategy converges at a slower pace than it does in the
simulations for the theoretical NPV strategy. This leads to the conclusion
that, by denition, an imprecise estimation of the correct parameters aects
the performance of the empirical NPV strategy, in some cases so much that
the empirical NPV strategy has no chance to survive. This concurs with
Tupak (2009), who nds that other strategies can perform better than 
if the latter must be learnt from the data. For innitely lived assets and
strategies that depend only on the state of the world, Theorem 2 of Amir
et al. (2009a) implies that the optimal strategy learnt from the data must not
survive against the optimal strategy that knows the true model parameters,
that is, other strategies may triumph over the estimated optimal strategy.
The simulations by DeMiguel et al. (2009) showed that thousands of monthly
observations are required before an optimal mean-variance strategy featuring
asset returns that possess a multivariate normal distribution can overcome
the naive 1=n strategy. This is mainly because the estimated average returns
of the strategies contain a high level of error. Thus, the implementation of
the theoretical optimal strategy may remain a challenge because of the errors
in the estimation of the dividend process.
6.3 Robustness Checks
Obviously, the set of strategies in the market can greatly inuence the out-
come; therefore, the NPV strategy should be tested against as many other
strategies as practicable in order to conrm the ndings presented above.
This was accomplished by further running the theoretical NPV strategy
against a wide range of xed-mix strategies. The fraction of funds invested in
IPOs was assumed constant at 0.2% of total investment, which is the rounded
average value of the NPV strategy if the number of companies is given by the
long-run average dened in equation (1). Total investment in concerns was
varied between 0% and 99.8% of total investment and was calculated using
quantities that diered by 0.1% from each other. This investment was equally
divided between all concerns and the rest of the investment was equally di-
vided between all startups. This resulted in the creation of 998 dierent
xed-mix strategies to compete with the NPV strategies in the market. The
theoretical NPV strategy started with 97% of total wealth with the rest di-
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Figure 7: The full line indicates the wealth share of xed-mix strategies
investing a constant share of wealth into concerns as averaged over 1,000
simulations. The dotted lines represent the 95% condence interval of the
strategies. The percentage of investment in concerns is shown on the x-
axis. The percentage of investment in IPOs holds steady at 0.2% of the
total investment and the remainder is invested in startups. The dashed line
represents the initial wealth share.
vided equally among the xed-mix strategies.9 Figure 6.3 shows the average
wealth share of the various xed-mix strategies after 5,000 periods simulated
1,000 times each. The dashed line represents the average wealth share of
these strategies in the rst period. Fixed-mix strategies that invested less
than 90.8% into concerns lose in average market share, while other xed-mix
strategies gain. Overall, the NPV strategy is able to increase its wealth share
and ends up with 99.3% of total wealth. Naturally, the gains of the xed-mix
strategies that invested heavily in concerns are obtained at the expense of
the xed-mix strategies that invested limited amounts in concerns. To com-
pare the successful xed-mix strategies with the NPV strategies, all xed-mix
strategies that had gained in average wealth shares (i.e., those that invested
90.8% or more of their total wealth in concerns) were then matched against
the NPV strategy. As before, all strategies involved were simulated 1,000
times per period over 5,000 periods. After 5,000 periods, the NPV strategy
amasses a wealth share of 96.9%. The 95% condence band rises from 93.9%
to 98.6%, indicating that the initial wealth of the strategy does not dier
statistically from the nal wealth. In contrast, none of the xed-mix strate-
9This percentage was chosen to make the setup comparable with that delineated in
Section 6.2. With an initial wealth of 90% of the theoretical NPV strategies, the results
are comparable and the theoretical NPV strategy gains massively in wealth shares.
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gies with a 95% condence interval are able to gain a statistically signicant
proportion of wealth shares and their wins or losses more or less amount to
zero (see Figure 7(b)). Overall, no xed-mix strategy is able to push the
NPV strategy out of the market. On the other hand, the NPV strategy is
also unable to push the xed-mix strategies completely out of the market
(although the wealth share of the latter is small). This evinces that the NPV
strategy is a very close approximation to the real dominant strategy but is
not itself the dominant strategy (given that such a strategy exists at all).
The results obtained in the previous section may dier according to vari-
ations in model parameters. Therefore, I ran additional tests in order to
evaluate the main hypothesis that the NPV strategy is locally evolution-
ary stable compared with the current relative dividend, historical relative
dividend, and naive investment strategies. This was done by estimating the
aforementioned strategies with several dierent sets of parameterizations and
examining the stability of the results thereby obtained. The NPV strategy
was simulated with parameters calculated from the previous 100 periods and
an initial wealth share of 97% and allocated the other strategies 1% each
of wealth share. The results show increases in the wealth share of the em-
pirical NPV strategy averaged out over 1,000 simulations over 5,000 time
periods (see Table 5) and shows that this strategy can increase its relative
weight under dierent parameterizations. This suggests that the NPV strat-
egy can survive the evolutionary timeline with a large share of wealth and
may therefore be at least close to a locally evolutionary stable strategy.
7 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that large dividend jumps and the creation, growth,
and default of companies are very important aspects of the dividend process.
The idealized model presented herein shows that these factors have consider-
able inuence on the performance of dierent investment strategies and signi-
es the inadequacy of considering only the time series of any given company
in determining the percentage of wealth that should be invested into that
company. Rather, these ndings suggest that comparable companies should
be studied in order to determine the optimal portfolio weight of companies.
This is a new idea that complicates many aspects of evolutionary nance,
including the estimation of an appropriate dividend model, and constitutes
an important drawback: even very primitive strategies can outperform the
most elaborate ones if a huge amount of data is required to estimate them
accurately. Nevertheless, the NPV strategy, a close substitute of the gen-
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Emp. Current Historical Naive
NPV rel. div. rel. div. investor
Initial relative wealth 0.970 0.010 0.010 0.010
Benchmark 0.980 0.011 0.000 0.008
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
0 = 10% 0.982 0.012 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
dC = 10 0.975 0.013 0.002 0.010
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
dC = 100 0.984 0.009 0.000 0.007
(0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
nnew = 5 0.978 0.012 0.002 0.008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
pCC = 98% 0.977 0.017 0.000 0.006
pCD = 2% (0.008) (0.005) (0.000) (0.006)
pSC = 2:0% 0.972 0.013 0.006 0.009
pSS = 95:7% (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
pSD = 5:0% 0.973 0.015 0.000 0.011
pSS = 92:3% (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Table 5: The average relative wealth shares of the four main strategies after
1,000 simulations of 5,000 periods. The gures in parentheses express the
standard deviations of the given percentages. The market comprises four in-
vestors: the empirical NPV investor (learning over 100 periods), the current
relative dividends investor, the historical relative dividend investor averaging
over 100 time periods, and the naive investor. Eight models were estimated:
the benchmark model, which was calculated according to the parameteriza-
tions in Table 3, and seven other models wherein one parameter has been
dierent compared to the benchmark model. The varied parameter and its
new value can be found in the leftmost column.
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eralized Kelly rule, dominates within this setup, although it requires long
time periods to approximate a 100% wealth share. Alternatively, this result
could also indicate that the strategy that is able to achieve the most precise
calculations of the fundamental value of a rms dividends will be the one to
survive or even dominate the market in the long run.
Simulation studies, such as this one, inherently face one major issue: it
is never possible to test the whole range of possible parameters. Therefore,
even with the extensive robustness checks carried out within the paper, there
is no guarantee that the results found can be generalized for all cases. Fur-
thermore, the Kelly strategy does not generalize to the chosen setup and
must be approximated by the NPV strategy. Therefore, the present paper
provides only a rough approximation of an evolutionary stable strategy.
This study generates three interesting directions for future research. First,
theoretical results pertaining to nonstationary dividends and nitely lived
rms would ascertain whether the results provided by simulations in this pa-
per are generally applicable. Second, future work could perform simulations
on the basis of alternative stochastic dividend processes in order to inves-
tigate the impact of such processes on the surviving strategy. Third, this
paper has shown that the learning period may wield a crucial inuence on
strategy performance. Therefore, future work could attempt to determine
how the dividend process should be learned optimally, such that the optimal
strategy based on those results is able to take over the market.
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